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EMPLOYMENT
I. DUE PROCESS IN DISMISSALS
Major v. DeFrench, 286 S.E.2d 688 (W. Va. 1982)
Recent developments in the area of due process in dismissals draw upon
the court's growing body of opinions illustrating the analysis and rationale em-
ployed in considering the extent of due process protection.' The court contin-
ues to rely upon the three-pronged test delineated in Matthews v. Eldridge.
2
The Matthews balancing test for determining the extent of due process protec-
tion afforded an individual when a property interest is involved requires con-
sideration of: (1) the private interests that are affected; (2) the risk of errone-
ous deprivation through the procedures used, and whether there exists a more
substantial procedural safeguard; and (3) the government's interest in terms of
fiscal and administrative burdens involved.3
The case of Major v. DeFrench4 represents the climax of a long struggle in
which the City of Morgantown had thwarted at every step the efforts of
Martha Major to become a permanent police officer. Morgantown had never
had a female police officer. Although Major had the second highest score on
her written civil service examination, the City initially refused to hire her. As a
consequence of a complaint lodged by Major, a federal agency found the City's
refusal to hire her was the result of sex discrimination.5 The agency ordered
Morgantown to hire Major. The City complied with the order but subsequently
attempted to discharge Major on three separate occasions. The City made a
final attempt at termination on the theory that Major's probationary period
was over. The City based its actions upon the belief that once the probationary
employment period ended there was no longer any requirment to abide by
West Virginia Code § 8-14-11 which sets forth procedures for probationary dis-
missal.6 Major instituted a civil action against the City of Morgantown and its
officials for wrongfully terminating her employment. Major alleged that the
discharge was violative of due process and was arbitrary and discriminatory.
Major sought both injunctive relief and damages.
The court found that Major's probationary period had not ended when the
City made its final attempt at discharge.7 Therefore, Major could not be termi-
nated without the procedural protections of notice and hearing provided pro-
W. VA. CONST., art. III, § 10 provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law, and the judgment of his peers." See Clarke v. West Virginia Bd. of
Regents, 279 S.E.2d 169 (W. Va. 1981); Waite v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 241 S.E.2d 164 (W. Va. 1978);
North v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 233 S.E.2d 411 (W. Va. 1977).
2 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
3 Id.
286 S.E.2d 688 (W. Va. 1982).
5 Id. at 691.
6 Id. at 692. W. VA. CODE § 8-14-11 (1976 & Supp. 1982) provides that police civil service
employees shall be provided a probationary period of one year.
7 286 S.E.2d at 694.
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bationary employees by West Virginia Code §§ 8-14-11 and 8-14-20.1 The court
held that the one-year probationary period of employment provided for in
West Virginia Code § 8-14-11 commenced when the individual began work.9
Further, the probationary employee must perform work for the full probation-
ary term. 10 If, as a result of forces beyond her control, the probationary em-
ployee is deterred from serving the complete probationary term, the term must
be extended.11 Major had been unable to work for the entire term because of
the City of Morgantown's efforts to discharge her without cause. Thus, her
probationary period had not expired and she was entitled to the procedural
protections afforded by West Virginia Code §§ 8-14-11 and 8-14-20.12
The court continued the analysis and stated that even if Major had been
dismissed at the conclusion of her probationary period she would have been
entitled to fair and reasonable procedural protections dictated by the require-
ments of due process." Justice McGraw, writing for the court, held "that a
police civil service employee who is dismissed at the end of her probationary
term is entitled, by virtue of her property and liberty interests in continued
employment, to procedural protections designed to insure the rationality of the
decision in continued employment.' 14
The statutory language of West Virginia Code § 8-14-11 was interpreted as
creating an expectancy in the probationary employee that employment will
continue if the job is adequately performed and eligibility requirements are
met."6 The expectancy interest was determined to be a property interest of
sufficient weight to demand procedural due process prior to any denial of per-
manent employment status.16
The court acknowledged that pursuit of a lawful occupation is a liberty
interest protected by procedural due process from arbitrary state interfer-
ence. 7 Major's liberty interest in continued employment as a police officer in-
cluded her "good name and her prospects for future employment."'" These im-
portant liberty interests demand that an employee be provided notice of any
charges against her and a fair hearing where the charges can be contested."
The court found that under the circumstances a denial of procedural protec-
tion to Major "would be an affront to liberty and to the due process clause."'"
I Id. W. VA. CODE § 8-14-20 (1976 & Supp. 1982) provides that a police civil service employee
during his or her probationary term is afforded the procedural protections of written notice of the
reasons for actions taken against him or her, and the opportunity for an adversarial hearing.
9 286 S.E.2d at 693.
1o Id. at 694.
11 Id.
12 Id.
Is Id.
14 Id. at 698.
" Id. at 696.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 697.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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The decision in Major firmly established the active role of the court in
promoting rational, nonarbitrary decision-making on the part of public em-
ployers. The court is extremely sensitive to the principle that procedural pro-
tections insure rational decision-making and reduce the risk of erroneous dep-
rivations of public employees' protected property and liberty interests in
continued employment.
II. BONDING REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION AND MINING EMPLOYERS
Perry v. Barker, 289 S.E.2d 423 (W. Va. 1982)
In Perry v. Barker21 the court took an active role in designing procedures
for the effective enforcement of West Virginia Code §§ 21-5-14 to 21-5-16,
which require employers engaged in the construction business or in the mining
industry who have been doing business in West Virginia for less than five years
to obtain a bond payable to the State to secure payment of wages and fringe
benefits to employees. Such action is an attempt to avert the social and eco-
nomic problems created by workplace closings in which employers lock their
gates and fail to pay wages and other fringe benefits. Posted bonds are neces-
sary to protect the taxpaying workforce from financially irresponsible, bank-
rupt, or absconding employers.
The petitioners, members of the United Mine Workers of America and
several employees of nonoperating, nonbonded coal companies who were not
paid wages when their employers shut down, sought a writ of mandamus to
compel the Commissioner of the Department of Labor to enforce the bonding
requirements of West Virginia Code § 21-5-14.22 The petitioners contended
that the failure of the Commissioner to enforce the bonding requirements had
caused numerous employees to be deprived of the protection of the Act and
the wages and benefits for which they worked.23
In response, the Commissioner argued that he had complied with the stat-
ute and implemented a program to police the bonding requirements. 2' The
Commissioner pleaded that he was allocated no additional funds for the imple-
mentation of the bonding requirements. 25 Only two inspectors were assigned to
enforce the bonding requirements. The court found that the Commissioner's
approach to policing the bonding provisions was inadequate and predestined to
failure.26 The plan for enforcement was deemed to suffer from being labor-
intensive, expensive and slow.27 The court noted that the cost of enforcement
should be placed "upon the violators of the law, rather than on the taxpaying
citizens."28
21 289 S.E.2d 423 (W. Va. 1982).
22 Id. at 425.
22 Id. at 427.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 429.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 431.
[Vol. 85
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The court stepped into the enforcement quagmire and suggested methods
for prompt and effective enforcement of the bonding requirements. It was sug-
gested that the Commissioner seek the aid of the Attorney General in issuing
subpoenas or summonses to each of the employers who have not complied with
the law.2 9 The employers would be required to show why they have not com-
plied. Secondly, the court suggested the use of mandatory injunction proceed-
ings. 0 The injunction proceedings would be instituted by the Attorney Gen-
eral, process for all corporate or limited partnership defendants may be served
on the Secretary of State, and costs of the action plus attorney fees could be
assessed against the defendants. Finally, those employers who have been noti-
fied of the duty to post bond and have failed to do so should be prosecuted by
the prosecuting attorneys of the various counties.$' Thus, the writ of manda-
mus was awarded and the Commissioner of the Department of Labor was or-
dered to go forward with a prompt and effective enforcement method consis-
tent with the opinion of the court.32
The decision in the Perry case affords an excellent example of the active
role of the modern court. When necessary, the court will not hesitate to act as
an administrator. Indeed, in Perry the court stepped into the controversy; in-
formed the Department of Labor that the Department's implementation ef-
forts were grossly inadequate; demanded that the Department implement ef-
fective techniques; and finally "suggested" how implementation should be
done.
III. HEALTH AND SAFETY
United Mine Workers of America u. Miller, 291 S.E.2d 673 (W. Va. 1982)
During the survey period, the court found that an authorized representa-
tive of miners has the right to accompany state mine inspectors for the pur-
pose of pointing out health and safety hazards without fear of employer dis-
crimination. 33 The court also found that the Director of the West Virginia
Department of Mines has a mandatory duty to enforce the laws of the State
which require the control of respirable dust in coal mines.3 4 Finally, the court
found that West Virginia Department of Mines mine inspectors have a clear
statutory duty to issue notices or orders for all violations of law found during
mine inspections.3 5
United Mine Workers of America v. Miller3 6 was an original proceeding in
mandamus. An inspector for the West Virginia Department of Mines con-
ducted a general mine inspection. The inspector was accompanied by two man-
agement individuals and an employee representative. The inspection took eight
29 Id. at 430.
0Id.
', Id. at 431.
32 Id. at 432.
33 UMWA v. Miller, 291 S.E.2d 673, 678-79 (W. Va. 1982).
11 Id. at 680.
" Id. at 683.
31 291 S.E.2d 673.
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hours and resulted in ten notices of violation and one withdrawal order for a
portion of the mine found to be dangerous. During the inspection the employee
representative pointed out a number of violations to the inspector. The iispec-
tor did not issue notices on a number of the violations, but gave oral warnings
instead. At the completion of the inspection the employee representative was
informed that his pay would be docked for the time spent in the inspection.
The inspector refused to take any action in regard to the docking of pay. The
basic contention of the United Mine Workers of America was that the Director
of the Department of Mines had failed to perform his statutory duty of enforc-
ing the health and safety laws.3 7
The court noted that it was clear that through the procedure of individual
mine inspections the Director of the Department of Mines has the duty to
execute and enforce standards for the protection of mine workers.3 8
West Virginia Code § 22-1-13 provides that "the authorized representative
of the miners at the mine at the time of such inspection shall be given an
opportunity to accompany the inspector on such inspection." 0 The court
found that the interplay of West Virginia Code § 22-1-13 with the West Vir-
ginia Wage Payment and Collection Act 40 necessitates the conclusion that a
representative assisting in a mine inspection is rendering a service for which he
is entitled to be paid.4
1
The court employed an economic analysis to illustrate that mine safety
and health is a concern not only of the State and the mine employees but of
the operators as well.42 The court noted the importance of having an employee
who is familiar with day-to-day operations assist the mine inspector.43 Retalia-
tory actions by operators against employees who assist in the mine inspection
process undermines the policy of the protection of the health and safety of
mine employees. Such retaliatory action is in contravention of established state
public policy. 44
The second issue addressed by the court in United Mine Workers of
America was whether the Director of the Department of Mines had a duty to
enforce the laws of the state requiring the control of respirable dust in coal
mines. The court found that the Director has a duty to require operators to
control dust within the allowable federal limits. 45 West Virginia Code § 22-2-48
was cited by the court as setting the minimum standards for respirable dust.40
Judicial notice was taken that excessive dust is a serious health hazard which
causes occupational pneumoconiosis.
37 Id. at 677.
" Id.
:9 W. VA. CODE § 22-1-13 (1981).
0' W. VA. CODE §§ 21-5-1 to -16 (1981 & Supp. 1982).
41 291 S.E.2d at 678.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 680.
48 Id.
[Vol. 85
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The court found a substantial difference between the federal standards for
respirable dust and the state standards. 47 The federal enforcement program48
places control of the sampling and reporting procedures in the hands of coal
operators, whereas the state4" requires miner participation in the policing of all
health and safety standards. Therefore, the court held that:
In determining standards for control of respirable dust the Director should
look to applicable federal statutes and regulations which are generally recog-
nized as authoritative on the subject. The procedure adopted by the Director
for enforcement of these standards must include the participation of miners or
their authorized representatives to insure the integrity of the monitoring
process. 10
Finally, the court held that when a safety or health hazard is pointed out
to an inspector, the inspector must make a written note of the alleged violation
and then proceed to determine whether a violation exists.51 If the inspector
declines to issue an order or citation the reasons for not doing so must be given
in writing.52 This procedure will ensure a record exists so that the inspector's
decisions may be reviewed in order to protect against arbitrary and capricious
enforcement.
53
The United Mine Workers of America case clearly protects mine employ-
ees from retaliatory employer actions aimed at authorized miner representa-
tives who seek to perform their duty of enforcing West Virginia law for the
purpose of protecting the health and safety of West Virginia miners. The case
also requires the Director of the Department of Mines and the mine inspectors
to affirmatively discharge their duties of enforcing the mine safety and health
laws.
IV. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Bailey v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 296 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va.
1982)
Hubbard v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 295 S.E.2d 659 (W. Va.
1981)
Breeden v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 285 S.E.2d 398 (W. Va. 1981)
Geeslin v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 294 S.E.2d 150 (W. Va. 1982)
The developments in workmen's compensation during the past year
demonstrate that the court is continuing to play an active and expansive role
in the area of workmen's compensation." The decisions of the court emphasize
47 Id. at 682.
48 30 U.S.C. § 842 (1976).
49 W. VA. CODE §§ 22-1-2, -12, -13, -14, -16, -17, -21 (1981).
50 291 S.E.2d at 682.
81 Id. at 684.
82 Id.
as Id.
54 For a review of the developing role of the court, see Flannery, The Expanding Role of the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in the Review of Workmen's Compensation Appeals, 81
W. VA. L. REv. 1, 33-34 (1979).
19831
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the beneficent purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act.5 Additionally,
the court continues to apply the liberality rule56 of construing evidence in a
fashion most favorable to the claimant.
In Bailey v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner7 the court
held that time limitations for appeals under the Workmen's Compensation Act
do not erect an absolute jurisdictional bar, but rather are procedural and
somewhat flexible.58 In so holding, the court overruled prior and substantial
authority to the contrary.59 As the court recognized, except for the State of
Arizona, there is an absolute lack of authority for such a relaxation of the stat-
utory time periods for filing notices of appeal.60
The court consolidated the appeals of three cases where the appellants
had all missed the statutory time requirements in the prosecution of their
claims. The appellees cited considerable authority for their argument that fail-
ure to file a timely notice of appeal operates as a jurisdictional bar.0 1 In re-
sponse, the court reviewed the development of the jurisdictional theory of time
limits. Justice Neely, writing for the majority, asserted that the jurisdictional
theory was a technique that allowed prior courts which were unsympathetic to
Workmen's Compensation claimants and unconcerned with advancing the
charitable purpose of the Act to put an end to litigation.6 2 The survival of the
theory was viewed as a result of "judicial inertia and neglect. 6 3
Noting that orderly procedures are necessary, the court addressed the is-
sue of how the time limitations of the Act should be applied so that both ad-
ministrative efficiency and claimant needs might be taken into account. The
court stated that acceptable excuses for failure to comply with time require-
ments include "innocent mistake, excusable neglect, unavoidable cause, any
fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party, or any other
reason justifying relief from the running of the time period. '64
In efforts to hurdle the time limitation bar, claimants must attach to their
claims an affidavit setting forth the reason for delay.65 The affidavit is to be
reviewed by the tribunal before which the claimant seeks to be heard so that a
preliminary decision can be made to determine whether the lateness was ex-
cusable.66 The court finds this procedure to be consistent with the spirit of
both the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in applying limitations to procedure in order "to do substantial jus-
5 W. VA. CODE §§ 23-1-1 to 23-6-1 (1981 & Supp. 1982).
" See Zackery v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'n, 253 S.E.2d 532 (W. Va. 1979).
57 296 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1982).
Id. at 905.
59 Id. at 902-03.
60 Id. at 906 n.5.
6' Id. at 903.
Id. at 905.
63 Id.
" Id.
15 Id. at 906.
"Id.
[Vol. 85
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tice.' '67 In this same vein, any legitimate reliance interest of the employer must
be given consideration by the tribunal making the preliminary lateness deter-
mination.68 Employers should not be expected to maintain records indefinitely
for purposes of potential future litigation for to do so would impose a great
administrative inconvenience. Some finality is needed to achieve an efficient
compensation system. Employers should be protected from claims too old to be
properly investigated and defended.6 9 Indeed, compensation issues should be
decided while memories are clear.
For purposes of applying the new rule, the court announced that it will
follow cases arising under the civil rules because they are fairly strict in defin-
ing excusable neglect.7 0 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, excusable
neglect is an elastic concept that requires good faith and a reasonable basis for
noncompliance within the specified time period.71
The opinion provides an admission of uncertainty as to the potential
workability of the new rule. Although the court found that the "Rhadaman-
thine application of procedural requirements would be incongruent with the
topography of today's legal landscape outside of Workmen's Compensation, ' 7 2
it nevertheless indicated a surprising willingness to return to the old jurisdic-
tion theory if the new rule proves unworkable. 73 The court warned practition-
ers that the holding is an experiment and that the liberal new rule must not be
taken advantage of or a return to "an interpretation as strict as the old 'juris-
dictional' doctrine will be inevitable. 7' This willingness to shift positions on
the time limit issue is disturbing in that it creates the potential for uncertainty
and confusion. Moreover, if the court is disenchanted with the application of
the jurisdictional technique and concerned that claimants receive full and fair
hearings on the merits of claims brought under the Act, how can the court
possibly propose a return to the old jurisdictional rule? If a return to the
stricter jurisdictional doctrine is necessitated, the court will have to reconcile
the broad pronouncements in Bailey with such a change.
The court's disenchantment with general time limitations and procedural
requirements of Workmen's Compensation was foreshadowed in Hubbard v.
State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner.75 In Hubbard, the court held
that workmen's compensation statutes in effect on the date of death of an in-
jured employee control the death claims of the dependents, rather than the
more restrictive statutes that were in effect when compensability was
determined.7 6
67 Id. at 907.
68 Id.
69 Lester v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 242 S.E.2d 443, 447 (W. Va. 1978).
70 296 S.E.2d at 907.
71 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVuL § 1165 at 622 (1969).
72 296 S.E.2d at 906.
73 Id. at 907-08.
74 Id.
71 295 S.E.2d 659 (W. Va. 1981).
76 Id. at 663.
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In 1965, the claimant's decedent had been granted an award for total disa-
bility resulting from silicosis. The date of last exposure was determined to be
in 1964. At the time this award was made, a statute was in effect providing
that dependent widows of employees who died from occupational pneumoconi-
osis were entitled to death benefits if the employee died within six years of the
date of last exposure. 7 In 1967, the legislature changed the term to ten years,
and in 1974 the time limitation was completely removed.7 8 Hubbard died of
the occupational illness in 1971-seven years after the date of last exposure
and four years after the 1967 amendment. The commissioner applied the 1961
version of the statute to the widow's claim and rejected her 1971 pro se appli-
cation for benefits since her husband died more than six years after his last
date of exposure to the work hazards. The 1961 version was the one in effect
when total disability was granted. In 1977, the claimant filed a second applica-
tion in which she requested that the 1971 application be made part of the re-
cord and that the commissioner set aside the previous ruling and grant bene-
fits. Both the commissioner and the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board
rejected the application.
The reversal by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals effected a
continuation of the reasoning applied in Lester v. State Workmen's Compen-
sation Commissioner.7
In Lester, when the claimant was last exposed to the employment hazards
of occupational pneumoconiosis, the Act required that claims for occupational
pneumoconiosis be filed within three years of the date of last exposure.80 The
three years had not expired when the legislature amended the statute, elimi-
nating all time requirements on filing with the exception that a claim must be
filed within three-years from and after the employee's occupational pneumo-
coniosis was made known to him by a physician or when he should reasonably
have known.8' The claimant filed his claim within three years after his disease
was made known to him but over three years from his date of last exposure.
The question presented to the Lester court was whether the amendments were
applicable to the claimant. The court held that the time limitations contained
in West Virginia Code § 23-4-15 were procedural and remedial in nature so
that amendments to the statute enlarging the limitation period should apply to
77 W. VA. CODE §§ 23-4-6a, 23-4-10 (1961).
78 W. VA. CODE § 23-4-10 (1981).
79 242 S.E.2d at 443.
80 W. VA. CODE § 23-4-15 (1970) provided in pertinent part:
To entitle any employee to compensation for occupational pneumoconiosis ... the ap-
plication... must be... filed... within three years from and after the last day of the
last continuous period of sixty days or more during which the employee was exposed to
the hazards of occupational pneumoconiosis.
81 W. VA. CODE § 23-4-15 (1981) provides in pertinent part:
To entitle any employee to compensation for occupational pneumoconiosis ... the ap-
plication... must be... filed... within three years from and after the last day of the
last continuous period of sixty days or more during which the employee was exposed to
the hazards of occupational pneumoconiosis, or within three years from and after the
employee's occupational pneumoconiosis was made known to him by a physician or
which he should reasonably have known, whichever shall last occur ....
[Vol. 85
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claims that had not yet expired under the previously existing period of
limitations."2
The Lester court found that rigid time limitations are "contrary to the
humanitarian purposes of workmen's compensation. . . . "Is Thus, the hold-
ing in Hubbard that the death claims of employees' dependents are controlled
by the statutes in effect on the date of death of the injured employee rather
than those statutes in effect when the employee's injury is found compensable
should not be surprising. Additionally, the holding is interconnected with the
rule in West Virginia that a dependent's claim for death benefits is separate
and distinct from the claim of the employee."'
Another issue dealt with by the court in the Hubbard case was the ques-
tion whether the doctrine of res judicata applied to bar the claimant's second
application. The employer argued that the initial order, correct or not, is final
because the claimant did not protest within the statutory period. 5 The em-
ployer contended that res judicata barred the second application.
In general, res judicata is a principle of judicial economy concerned with
finality rather than justice. 6 On the other hand, Workmen's Compensation is
intended to provide a streamlined, quick and efficient system for reaching just
decisions in the handling of claims of injured employees.87 Yet, there is a need
for proper, orderly procedure and finality in order for a proper investigation of
the merits to be conducted. The court acknowledged the tension between the
potentially harsh effects of res judicata and the beneficent policy of Workmen's
Compensation. The court quoted Professor Larson:
The question that constantly recurs in cases involving the procedural rules of
workmen's compensation law is whether, in any particular cases involving the
loss of benefits for procedural reasons under an otherwise meritorious claim,
the indispensability of the procedural purpose so served outweighs the thwart-
ing of the protective function of the act.88
The court found that the only reason the claimant was denied benefits was
the failure of the commissioner to apply the correct statute. The court would
not apply the doctrine of res judicata and reiterated the holding of White v.
State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,"9 "in light of the scope and
purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act and the quasi-judicial summary
proceeding in which claims are decided, the doctrine of res judicata would not
bar compensation applications where the only obvious reason for rejection of
the original claim was that it was untimely filed.""0
82 242 S.E.2d at 447.
B3 Id.
84 295 S.E.2d 659, 663 (W. Va. 1981).
85 Id. at 664.
86 1B J. MOORE & T. CuRR=R, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.405(1) (2d ed. 1982).
87 Mitchell v. State Workmen's Compensation Comnm'r, 256 S.E.2d 1, 9 (W. Va. 1979).
88 295 S.E.2d 659, 664 (W. Va. 1981) (quoting 3 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMN'S COMPEN-
SATION § 78.10 (1982)).
a' White v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 262 S.E.2d 752 (W. Va. 1980).
80 295 S.E.2d 659, 665 (W. Va. 1981) (quoting White, 262 S.E.2d at 757).
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The final issue addressed by the Hubbard court was whether the Commis-
sioner had the jurisdiction to set aside the 1972 order denying benefits when no
protest or appeal had been made by the claimant. Ordinarily, there is no juris-
diction to set aside a final order except in instances provided by statute or
where the final order was made through fraud or mistake."' In previous deci-
sions, it had been held that a mistake which would justify setting aside a final
order must be more than an erroneous decision of the commissioner.9 The
court rejected prior "mistake" analysis and held that
the mistaken application by the commissioner of the wrong procedural statute,
which deprives an otherwise qualified claimant of the widow's benefits to
which she is entitled under the statutes in effect on the date of her husband's
death, is a mistake which justifies the setting aside of a final order.9 3
In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that, "the policy of according final-
ity to orders of the commissioner must be balanced with the protective func-
tions of the act. '94 Thus, a trend can be discerned which demonstrates the
willingness of the court to by-step procedural requirements in the interest of
protecting claimants.
In Breeden v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,5 the court dealt
with whether a physical or mental disability which results from workplace
stress is a compensable disability under workmen's compensation.
The claimant's position was that she had been the recipient of constant
harassment, humilitation, castigation and physical and verbal abuse from her
supervisor. The abusive treatment allegedly manifested itself in a depressive
neurosis which has associated with it a number of physical and mental ail-
ments. The claimant's phychiatrist testified that the claimant's symptoms in-
cluded headaches, gastrointestinal difficulties, anxiety and depression. The em-
ployer's position was that the claimant was depressed as a result of marital
problems. A psychiatrist testified that Breeden's predominate difficulty was
within her marriage. Both the Commissioner and the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Appeal Board denied the claimant's application for benefits.
Despite substantial conflicting evidence, the court found that the three
necessary requirements for a compensable claim, "(1) a personal injury (2) re-
ceived in the course of employment and (3) resulting from that employment,"
had been met by the claimant.96 Therefore, the court reversed the decision of
the Commissioner and the Appeal Board.
In recent years, the volume of litigation pertaining to mental and nervous
conditions has been growing throughout the country. Professor Larson suggests
that such conditions may be broken down into three basic categories: (1)
92 295 S.E.2d 659, 665 (W. Va. 1981).
" See Stewart v. State Compensation Director, 150 W. Va. 103, 108, 144 S.E.2d 327, 330
(1965).
93 295 S.E.2d 659, 668 (W. Va. 1981).
" Id. at 667.
91 285 S.E.2d 398 (W. Va. 1981).
"Id. at 400.
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mental stimulus causing physical injury; (2) physical trauma causing nervous
injury; and (3) mental stimulus causing nervous injury." Compensability is
generally found for the first two categories. 8 The third category is more hotly
disputed although there are signs of a distinct majority position supporting
compensability. 99 With the Breeden decision West Virginia acknowledges com-
pensability for all three basic categories of mental conditions.
In an extremely complex, technological and dynamic society, innumerable
pressures are daily exerted upon individuals which affect both physical and
mental well-being. Often, there are so many different and variable pressures
affecting individuals that it is difficult to isolate the causes of mental and ner-
vous conditions. In workmen's compensation claims, an individual who has
been injured by stress, which is claimed to be rooted in the workplace, should
be required to demonstrate the probable cause of his injury in order to recover.
With one broad stroke of the pen, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals has held that an employee, who sustains mental or emotional injury as a
result of workplace stress extending over a period of time, has suffered a com-
pensable personal injury. Yet, the court failed to provide any guidelines as to
how to identify a causal link between neurosis and employment as opposed to
other environmental stimuli. Such guidelines are a necessity if industry is to
bear the cost of disabilities it has caused and not simply fund nervous illness
caused by the everyday stress and strain of modern life. It would seem that
there must necessarily be some requirement of satisfactory proof at least with
regard to obscure nervous disorders as to which even medical experts may not
agree. As to the cause of the claimant's suffering in Breeden, the decision ap-
pears to have turned on which psychiatrist was to be believed, the claimant's
or the employer's. It is questionable whether the liberality rule of construing
the evidence in a manner most favorable to the claimant is appropriate in the
category of mental stimulus causing nervous injury.
A further question raised by the Breeden opinion concerns the potential
for claimant abuse. Although depressive neurosis is a very real disability, com-
mon malingering and the danger of fictitious claims present a real potential
danger. The danger is not insurmountable. However, the court did not address
the potential problem nor did the court discuss the real nature of the injury.
There is a need for the court to lay down perimeters as to what constitutes
satisfactory evidence of mental distress and the causation factor.
It remains to be seen how the broad language of the court will be applied
by the Commissioner and the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board.
In Geeslin v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,'"0 West Virginia
joined a growing number of jurisdictions that have rejected the availability of
the aggressor rule as a defense. 101 The court held that "[w]here an altercation
97 1B A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.20 (1982).
98 Id. at § 42.21, -.22.
09 Id. at § 42.23.
100 294 S.E.2d 150 (W. Va. 1982).
1o A number of jurisdictions have rejected the aggressor rule. See Clover v. Industrial Com-
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arises out of the employment, the fact that the claimant was the aggressor does
not, standing alone, bar compensation under the West Virginia Compensation
Act, West Virginia Code 23-1-1 et seq., for injuries claimant sustained in the
altercation." '
Geeslin sustained injuries as a result of a fight with the supervisor. Geeslin
was subsequently denied the claim on the grounds that his injuries were due to
his willful misconduct. On appeal, the employer argued that Geeslin was
barred from recovery under the aggressor rule. The court recognized that the
aggressor rule had been abolished in a number of jurisdictions. 0 3
The difficulties in finding fault among parties whose actions are not easily
distinguished as aggressor or victim in work environment altercations were dis-
cussed by the court. Additionally, the court noted that use of the aggressor rule
analysis imports tort based notions into the workmen's compensation deci-
sions. The court cited language to the effect that the rule ignores the reality
that humans, not robots, are the workers in an industrial setting and they
bring all their human frailties to the workplace. 04 Thus, the workplace does
not exist in a vacuum and "course of employment" is not a static concept.
Because of the employer's position that Geeslin was barred from benefits
as a result of willful misconduct, the court also analyzed the willful misconduct
provision of the West Virginia Code. The court's prior hesitancy to deny com-
pensation because of such conduct was cited. The rule of Billings v. State
Compensation Commissioner °5 that "[u]nder Code, 23-4-2, willful misconduct
will not bar compensation unless the injury is the result thereof'10 6 was relied
upon to find that Geeslin was entitled to benefits since his supervisor's retalia-
tory attack went far beyond what could have been reasonably expected.'0 7
Therefore, Geeslin's misconduct was not the cause of his injuries.
In summary, during the survey period, the court has abolished the aggres-
sor defense; 08 found mental or physical disability resulting from workplace
stress to be a compensable injury; 0 9 determined that the statutes in effect on
the date of death of an injured employee control the death claims of the em-
ployee's dependents;" 0 and held that time limitations under the Workmen's
Compensation Act are not jurisdictional, but rather procedural."'
mission, 21 Ariz. App. 409, 520 P.2d 322 (1974); Hall v. Clark, 360 S.W.2d 140 (Ky. 1962); Dillon's
Case, 324 Mass. 102, 85 N.E.2d 69 (1949).
'02 294 S.E.2d at 155.
'0' Id. at 155 n.2.
104 Id. at 154-55.
100 123 W. Va. 498, 16 S.E.2d 804 (1941).
100 Geeslin, 294 S.E.2d at 156 (quoting Billings, 123 W. Va. 498, 16 S.E.2d 804 at syl. pt. 2).
107 294 S.E.2d at 157.
:08 Geeslin v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 294 S.E.2d 150 (W. Va. 1982).
'00 Breeden v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 285 S.E.2d 398 (W. Va. 1981).
1 Hubbard v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 295 S.E.2d 659 (W.Va. 1981).
Bailey v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 296 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1982).
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V. BOARD OF EDUCATION EMPLOYEES
Higgins v. Board of Education, 286 S.E.2d 682 (W. Va. 1982)
Board of Education v. State Superintendent of Schools, 295 S.E.2d 719 (W.
Va. 1982)
Golden v. Board of Education, 285 S.E.2d 665 (W. Va. 1981)
Board of Education v. Hunley, 288 S.E.2d 524 (W. Va. 1982)
The cases involving decisions relating to school board employees demon-
strate the continuing attempt of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
to establish orderly procedures by which evaluation of personnel can be accom-
plished without violating due process rights.
In Higgins v. Board of Education,"2 the court considered the applicability
of Policy No. 5300(6)(a) of the Policies, Rules and Regulations of the West
Virginia Board of Education to the selection of personnel for voluntary trans-
fer and promotion. Policy No. 5300(6)(a)" 3 provides that decisions of promo-
tion, demotion, transfer and termination should be based upon prior, open and
regular evaluations which are made known to the employee.
Higgins contended she was denied a promotion that was awarded to a less
qualified applicant who, unlike Higgins, did not possess a master's degree. The
position required an individual qualified to teach high school English and
coach the cheerleading team. The selected applicant had experience in both
areas in addition to serving as the yearbook sponsor at another high school.
Higgins' experience was in teaching junior high. The primary factors for select-
ing the other applicant over Higgins were the other applicant's personality and
enthusiasm for extracurricular activities. Evaluations demonstrated that both
teachers were performing their duties well, although Higgins' numerical score
was slightly higher. Apparently, Higgins desired that the quantified subjective
evaluations be mechanically applied so as to warrant the conclusion that Hig-
gins was the superior teacher. The court refused to do this, noting the
problems associated with comparisons of subjective evaluations.' 4 Addition-
ally, the court noted that possession of a master's degree is only one of the
factors to be considered in evaluating teachers."'
The court held that, although Policy No. 5300 is applicable to voluntary
transfers, it is not the purpose of the policy to make all personnel decisions
dependent upon the mechanical application of such criteria as seniority, evalu-
ations, or degrees because there are many important human qualities that can
112 286 S.E.2d 682 (W. Va. 1982).
113 § 5300(6)(a) states:
Every employee is entitled to know how well he is performing his job, and should be
offered the opportunity of open and honest evaluation of his performance on a regular
basis. Any decision concerning promotion, demotion, transfer, or termination of employ-
ment should be based upon such evaluation, and not upon factors extraneous thereto.
Every employee is entitled to the opportunity of improving his job performance prior to
the termination or transferring of his services, and can only do so with assistance of
regular evaluation.
114 286 S.E.2d at 685.
'a Id.
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only be judged subjectively through personal contact.'1 6
The decision in Higgins is important because it announces the judicially
perceived purpose of Policy No. 5300. The court stated, "the primary purpose
of Policy 5300 is to prevent discriminatory or retaliatory transfers or demon-
strations which would cause bad morale, insecurity and poor performance on
the part of school employees. 11 7 Thus, the court held that it would not inter-
vene in administrative decisions involving voluntary transfers and promotions
unless there is evidence of abuse.11 The court offers no guidelines for deter-
mining at what point the use of very subjective qualities may be abused and
the rational merit promotion system effectively discarded. The dissent of Jus-
tices McHugh and McGraw expresses grave concern with the broad latitude
given by the majority to administrators in the transfer and promotion of
teachers.
In Board of Education v. State Superintendent of Schools,11 9 the Mason
County Board of Education appealed a circuit court decision that ordered a
principal reinstated and awarded $148,362.36 in back pay for the years 1973
through 1981. The Board argued that because the principal had been employed
under a three-year probationary contract that would have expired in 1975, the
damages should be limited to the years of the contract. The court did not ac-
cept the Board's argument because of the special due process protection af-
forded probationary teachers by Policy No. 5300.120
The court decided that a wrongfully terminated employee has a duty to
mitigate damages. The rule of measuring damages as the total of the em-
ployee's back pay from the date of discharge to the date of reinstatement was
rejected. 1 ' The court noted that the public should not be saddled with enor-
mous damage awards merely because a governmental agency makes a technical
violation of due process. The court concluded that unless a wrongful discharge
is malicious, the discharged employee has an obligation in certain circum-
stances to mitigate his damages by seeking other employment. 122
With respect to mitigation of damages, the court adopted the general
rule 1 23 enunciated by Professor McCormick with an exception as to the term of
:16 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
:19 295 S.E.2d 719 (W. Va. 1982).
20' Id. at 722.
121 Id. at 723.
122 Id. at 725.
123 The general principles enunciated by McCormick applicable to the issue of mitigation of
damages are as follows:
The plaintiff suing for wrongful discharge need only prove the amount he was to
earn under the contract for the remainder of the term of the employment, and the defen-
dant has the burden of proving what the plaintiff did earn, or could by reasonable dili-
gence have earned, in other employment during that period.
If the plaintiff has actually secured other employment of whatever kind, the amount
earned will be deducted from the total earnings which would have accrued under the
contract with the defendant, in measuring damages, but, in ascertaining whether he
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employment of a state employed teacher.124
The court instructed that if similar employment is locally available to a
wrongfully discharged employee, he will be charged, in mitigation, the amount
that would have been earned if accepted. 12 5 Any actual wages received in an-
other job are an offset to damages unless the job was "compatible" with the
former job. 2 ' By the term "compatible," the court means to inquire whether
the job could have been performed concurrently with the former employment.
As an affirmative defense, mitigation of damages must be raised and proved by
the employer, but the employee who has not secured employment must show
that he or she used reasonable and diligent efforts to secure acceptable
employment.'2
7
Lastly, if the wrongfully discharged employee secures employment so that
the offset of mitigation reduced the damage award to a mere nominal amount,
the employee is still entitled to reasonable attorney fees and expenses. 28
In Golden v. Board of Education,'29 the court considered whether a shop-
lifting incident and the resulting fine constituted a serious act of immorality
under West Virginia Code § 18A-2-8' 0 so as to cause the dismissal of Golden, a
high school guidance counselor. The court ordered the reinstatement of Golden
with back pay and found that, by itself, a misdemeanor conviction does not
constitute immorality.1
3
'
The court noted that when confronted with an immorality question, it
must be determined whether a "rational nexus" exists between the "immoral"
behavior and the responsibilities of employment so that the behavior indicates
unfitness to teach. 32 In designing this requirement, the court was concerned
with two issues. First, the court noted that examination of only the conduct
would violate substantive due process rights.133 Second, the court was inter-
ested in preserving the teacher's right to privacy.13
Although the holding in Golden is extremely important for teachers, the
court provided no definitional standards for determing when a teacher's con-
could have secured other employment, the plaintiff will only be charged with what he
could have earned in another position of the same grade, in the same line of work, or in
the same locality.
C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 159-60, at 627, 629 (1935).
124 295 S.E.2d at 724.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 725.
:27 Id. at 725-26.
,:8 Id. at 726.
129 285 S.E.2d 665 (W. Va. 1981).
,' W. VA. CODE § 18A-2-8 (1977) states in part:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, a board may suspend or dismiss any person
in its employment at any time for: Immorality, incompetency, cruelty, insubordination,
intemperance or wilful neglect of duty. ...
:3, Golden, 285 S.E.2d at 669.
132 Id. at 668.
"I Id. at 669.
134 Id.
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duct outside the classroom will affect in class fitness so as to reasonably justify
discharge. Justice Neely, in a vigorous dissent, argued that stealing is a crime
of moral turpitude and, since teachers are authority figures and role models,
children should not be subjected to a teacher who has by example supported
crime. 135
The decision of the court in Board of Education v. Hunley'36 demon-
strates the adamant requirement of the court that the board comply strictly
with applicable procedures set forth in the West Virginia Code. The case in-
volved the change in position of three employees from full-time secretaries
who, by virtue of length of service had continuing contract status, to the posi-
tion of half-time secretaries. The change was necessitated by financial
problems uncommunicated to the three employees. The Board attempted to
characterize the change as a transfer. However, the court found that the Board
actually terminated, without notice, the contracts with the employees and sup-
planted them with new ones. The court concluded that the Board should have
followed the statutory requirements for termination. 137 Thus, the Board was
found to have subverted the requirements of notice and right to hearing and
was ordered to reinstate the three employees at full salary and workdays
retroactively. 138
VI. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Cooper v. Rutledge, 286 S.E.2d 920 (W. Va. 1982)
Lee-Norse Company v. Rutledge, 291 S.E.2d 477 (W. Va. 1982)
Kirk v. Cole, 288 S.E.2d 547 (W. Va. 1982)
In two recent cases, the court has considered the meaning of the term
"misconduct" as it is used in disqualifying individuals from unemployment
compensation benefits.'3 9 The opinions reflect the court's concern with further-
ing the purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Act to provide "reasona-
ble and effective means for the promotion of social and economic security by
reducing as far as practicable the hazards of unemployment." 4 0 The court con-
tinues to apply the rule that the Unemployment Compensation Act should be
liberally construed so as to advance the remedial propose of the Act.141
In Cooper v. Rutledge,4 2 the court considered whether claimants should
be ineligible to receive benefits for six weeks as a consequence of their partici-
pation in unauthorized but peaceful picketing. The Board of Review of the
West Virginia Department of Employment Security had held that the claim-
ants were discharged for misconduct within the meaning of W. Va. Code §
"35 Id. at 670.
--6 288 S.E.2d 524 (W. Va. 1982).
,37 Id. at 525.
138 Id. at 525-26.
"I Cooper v. Rutledge, 286 S.E.2d 920 (W. Va. 1982); Kirk v. Cole, 288 S.E.2d 547 (W. Va.
1982).
"o W. VA. CODE § 21A-1-1 (1981).
Lee-Norse Co. v. Rutledge, 291 S.E.2d 477, 481 (W. Va. 1982).
14 286 S.E.2d 920 (W. Va. 1982).
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21A-6-3(2).' 43
Thus, the claimants were found to be disqualified from receiving benefits
for a period of six weeks. The circuit court affirmed the disqualification for
benefits.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found the factual context of
the case to be unique in that evidence indicated the claimants had been fired
prior to the commencement of picketing.'4 Therefore, the employer-employee
relationship had terminated prior to the alleged misconduct.145 The statute
contemplates that there exists a master-servant relationship at the time of the
misconduct. The court concluded that "employees who are fired and subse-
quently engage in demonstrations against their former employer are not guilty
of misconduct within the meaning of W. Va. Code § 21A-6-3(2) so as to be
disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits.",
46
What is significant about the Cooper decision is that the court went much
further in its holdings than the specific facts of the case necessitated. The
court stated that even if the employees had not been terminated prior to the
picketing, the activities of the employees during the period of work stoppage
would not have constituted misconduct within W. Va. Code § 21A-6-3(2).' 41
The court adopted the analysis of In re Heitzenrater'4 s in which a New York
court concluded that "mere participation in a strike, which may be in breach of
a no-strike clause, or otherwise impermissible or proscribed, does not consti-
tute 'misconduct'. ' 149 The Heitzenrater court cautioned that if there were vio-
lence or sabotage then the strike participants may be guilty of misconduct so
as to deny them unemployment benefits.' 50 The West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals did not specifically adopt the Heitzenrater warnings. However, it is
clear from the discussion that had there been evidence of destruction of prop-
erty or violence the court may have denied benefits to the claimants.
The court, in its discussion, seems to ignore W. Va. Code 21A-6-3(4) which
provides that a person is disqualified from participating in the benefits of the
Unemployment Compensation Act for any week in which the employment is
,43 W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3(2) (1981) defines misconduct as follows:
Misconduct consisting of willful destruction of his employer's property, assault upon the
person of his employer or any employee of his employer, if such assault is committed at
such individual's place of employment or in the course of employment; reporting to work
in an intoxicated condition, or being intoxicated while at work; arson, theft, larceny,
fraud or embezzlement in connection with his work; or any other gross misconduct; he
shall be and remain disqualified for benefits until he has thereafter worked for at least
thirty days in covered employment: Provided, that for the purpose of this subdivision
the words "any other gross misconduct" shall include, but not be limited to, any act or
acts of misconduct where the individual has received prior written warning that termina-
tion of employment may result from such act or acts.
144 286 S.E.2d at 923.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 277 N.Y.S.2d 633, 224 N.E.2d 72 (1966).
149 286 S.E.2d at 924 (quoting In re Heitzenrater, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 637, 224 N.E.2d at 75).
"I Heitzenrater, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 639, 224 N.E.2d at 76.
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due to a work stoppage. Moreover, the court has confused the issue. If there
has been a work stoppage there is no need to enter into a misconduct analysis.
The purpose of the disqualification is to prevent strikes from being financed by
state funds because the position of the state in labor disputes is one of neutral-
ity.151 Although it appears that the public policy objective of maintaining in-
dustrial peace collides with the objective of providing financial assistance to
the unemployed, the court made no attempt in Cooper to balance the two. A
conceivable result of this decision may be a weakening of the incentive of en-
courging union employees to comply with no-strike clauses of collective bar-
gaining agreements. To allow an individual who has been fired because of par-
ticipation in an improper strike to receive benefits would be a "reward" for
breaching his contractual agreement not to strike. On the other hand, there are
situations such as hazardous and unsafe working conditions which may war-
rant a violation of a no-strike clause. The two situations are dissimilar, and to
afford equal benefits to both the justified and the unjustified striker may en-
courage illegal and irresponsible work stoppages in violation of contract.
Rather than simply adopting the holding of Heitzenrater, the court should
have entered into its own analysis and distinguished between those who breach
no-strike contracts with justification as opposed to those who breach
irresponsibly.
A similar issue was dealt with in Lee-Norse Company v. Rutledge ' 2 in
which the court confronted the issue of whether the labor dispute disqualifica-
tion for unemployment benefits found in West Virginia Code § 21A-6-3(4) ap-
plied to a company lockout which was based solely on business and economic
motivations. The employees were locked out during collective bargaining for a
new contract even though negotiations were continuing and had not reached an
impasse. Lee-Norse contended that the lockout was a protective one; since the
contract had expired, there was uncertainty as to whether there would be a
strike. The locked-out workers were denied benefits under West Virginia Code
§ 21A-6-3(4) by the Board of Review and the Kanawha County Circuit Court
reversed.
The court held that such a work stoppage was not a result of a labor dis-
pute so as to deny benefits. 53 Previously, West Virginia adhered to the view
that a lockout constituted a disqualifying labor dispute within the meaning of
the labor dispute disqualification provision of the unemployment compensa-
tion statute.1 54 Therefore, the court overruled the inconsistent language of
Cumberland & Allegheny Gas Co. v. Hatcher' 5 and Miners in General Group
v. Hix.1 56
The court adopted the view that work stoppages resulting from manage-
'5' Homer Laughlin China Co. v. Hix, 128 W. Va. 613, 37 S.E.2d 649 (1946).
291 S.E.2d 477 (W. Va. 1982).
,53 Id. at 481.
' See Cumberland & Allegheny Gas Co. v. Hatcher, 147 W. Va. 630, 130 S.E.2d 115 (1963),
and Miners In General Group v. Hix, 123 W. Va. 637, 17 S.E.2d 810 (1941).
x 147 W. Va. 630, 130 S.E.2d 115.
156 123 W. Va. 637, 17 S.E.2d 810.
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ment fears during collective bargaining negotiations are not the result of labor
disputes so as fall within the West Virginia Code § 21A-6-3(4) disqualification.
In order to reach this result the court relied heavily upon the stated legislative
purposes of the Unemployment Compensation Act.15 7 When individuals have
been locked out and are ready and willing to work they are involuntarily unem-
ployed and the Act is designed to assist them. 158
The underlying rationale of the court is that the disqualification should
not be used by an employer as leverage to effectuate and enforce a lockout.
The rationale is founded on the beneficent objectives of the Unemployment
Compensation Act in promoting social and economic stability through reducing
the hazards of unemployment.
In Kirk v. Cole the court held that absence from work as a result of illness
does not per se constitute misconduct so as to disqualify claimants from re-
ceiving benefits for a six-week period.159 The record was clear in Kirk that
there had been a considerable number of absences due to sickness. However,
the court could find no misconduct on the part of the appellant.
The court's analysis began with an acknowledgment of a general definition
of misconduct used in other jurisdictions. 6 0 The suggestion was that miscon-
duct consists of actions which demonstrate an intentional or willful disregard
of the needs of the employer. Although the court held that absence due to
sickness does not alone constitute misconduct, the court cautioned that where
there are reasonable rules regarding proper notice of verification of illness one
must adhere to such rules.' 6 ' Failure to follow the employer's rules relating to
absence procedures can constitute misconduct so as to deprive the employee of
unemployment benefits for a six-week period.6 2 The holding in Kirk adopts
what appears to be the general rule.' 6 3
Thus, during the survey period the court has consistently applied a liberal
construction to the West Virginia unemployment statutes.
'57 291 S.E.2d at 481.
1B8 Id. at 482-83.
159 288 S.E.2d 547 (W. Va. 1982).
160 [M]isconduct is:
conduct evincing such willful and wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found
in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the
right to expect of his employee, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree or recur-
rence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an in-
tentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's du-
ties and obligations to his employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory
conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadverten-
cies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors or judgment or dis-
cretion are not to be deemed 'misconduct' within the meaning of the statute.
Kirk, 288 S.E.2d at 549 (quoting Carter v. Michigan Employment Security Comm., 364 Mich. 538,
541, 111 N.W.2d 817, 819 (1961).
161 288 S.E.2d at 550.
142 Id.
163 1B UNEaPL. INs. REP. (CCH) 1970 at 4454.
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V. RETALIATORY DISCHARGE
Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont, 289 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982)
Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co., 285 S.E.2d 679 (W. Va. 1982),
The significance of Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmontl6" (herein-
after referred to as Harless-IH) is that it provides guidelines pertaining to what
damages can be sought and under what legal theory when litigating a retalia-
tory discharge action.
The Harless-II decision is a sequel to the court's opinion in Harless v.
First National Bank in Fairmont6 " (hereinafter referred to as Harless-I)
which authorized the retaliatory discharge cause of action in West Virginia.
The rule and underlying rationale of Harless-I was expressed in the single syl-
labus of the court:
The rule that an employer has an absolute right to discharge an at-will em-
ployee must be tempered by the principle that where the employer's motiva-
tion for the discharge is to contravene some substantial public policy principle,
then the employer may be liable to the employee for damages occasioned by
this discharge.16
Harless-II stands for the proposition that there can only be one recovery
of damages for one injury. 6 7 In the trial court the case had been presented to
the jury on three distinct theories for recovery: (1) the action of retaliatory
discharge; (2) the tort of outrageous conduct; and (3) the claim of blackballing
and blacklisting. 68
Special interrogatories were presented to the jury on the issue of dam-
ages.16 The jury verdict awarded Harless both compensatory and punitive
damages against the bank and against Wilson, a supervisor, for both the tort of
retaliatory discharge and the tort of outrageous conduct.1 70 The jury addition-
ally awarded compensatory and punitive damages against Wilson for blackbal-
ling and blacklisting.1 7 1
The trial court struck the award for blackballing on the grounds that there
was insufficient evidence.172 The judge struck the retaliatory discharge dam-
ages awarded against Wilson on the theory that Wilson did not directly dis-
charge Harless. 17 Finally, the compensatory and punitive damages rendered
against the bank on the theory of outrageous conduct were removed by the
trial court because of insufficient evidence.1 74 Both parties appealed the final
1 289 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982).
165 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
16 Id. at 271.
167 289 S.E.2d at 705.
I" Id. at 695.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
272 Id.
17 Id.
174 Id.
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order of the court.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the trial court
erred when it determined that Wilson could not be found liable for the retalia-
tory discharge. 175 The court found that the evidence demonstrated that Wilson
was directly involved in the bank's unlawful practices. Further, as the plain-
tiff's immediate supervisor, Wilson was hostile to the plaintiff's efforts to cor-
rect the unlawful practices. The court stated that "[t]he fact that Wilson did
not directly fire the plaintiff does not relieve him of liability" because the rela-
tionship of the employer bank and the employee Wilson is similar to that of
joint tortfeasors.'" 8
In discussing the issue of whether the plaintiff should have been permitted
to recover for emotional distress as a part of the compensatory damages, the
court noted that the law regarding the measure of damages that may be recov-
ered for the tort of retaliatory discharge is rather sparse. 177 In analyzing the
problem the court relied on tort damage law and noted that Monteleone v. Co-
Operative Transit Co.718 held that a plaintiff could recover compensatory dam-
ages for emotional distress arising from the wrongful acts of another. Because
retaliatory discharge actions are premised on the wrongful and deliberate dis-
charge of an employee who chooses to exercise a public policy right, the court
held that damages for emotional distress may be recovered as part of compen-
satory damages.179 The court explicitly acknowledged that the role of the jury
in assessing damages for emotional distress will be governed only by common
sense.
180
The third issue of damages addressed by the court was whether there is a
right to punitive damages in a retaliatory discharge action. The court held that
there is no automatic right to punitive damages. 81 The holding was premised
upon the "open-endedness in the limits of recovery for emotional distress in a
retaliatory discharge claim. 18 2 If the actions of the employer are shown to be
willful, wanton or malicious then punitive damages may be appropriate.183 The
court concluded that the circumstances of the case did not demonstrate that
an award of punitive damages would be appropriate.'
The final issue confronting the court was whether recovery should have
been permitted on the claim of the tort of outrageous conduct. The court noted
that a great degree of similarity exists in the character of outrageous conduct
and the action of retaliatory discharge.185 Further, there is a considerable de-
176 Id. at 699.
176 Id. at 698-99.
177 Id. at 700.
178 128 W. Va. 340, 36 S.E.2d 475 (1945).
179 289 S.E.2d at 702.
180 Id.
11 Id. at 703.
182 Id.
I" Id.
184 Id.
I" Id. at 705.
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gree of congruence in the damages recoverable. 58 Because there can be only
one recovery for one injury, the court held that a claim of outrageous conduct
is duplicitous to a claim for retaliatory discharge.18 7 Thus, the court dismissed
the outrageous conduct cause of action.
The actions of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reduced
plaintiff's award from $125,000 to $25,000.111 The court recognized that if only
the retaliatory discharge theory of damages had been given to the jury the
award may have been greater.28 Thus, the case was remanded for retrial of the
damages. However, the plaintiff was given the option of remittitur due to the
protracted nature of the case.190
Harless-II provides guidance as to the proper award of damages in the
plethora of lawsuits which have been spawned by Harless-I.
In Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co.""" the cause of action for retaliatory dis-
charge was found to be sufficiently related to an action for fraud or deceit so as
to extend the time in which the action may be brought. The plaintiff, Stanley,
was an employee at will who claimed he was discharged by the defendant so
that the defendant could prevent discovery of its false reporting of accidents to
the Mine Enforcement Safety Administration. The defendant claimed the dis-
charge was a result of excessive absenteeism. Stanley's action for retaliatory
discharge was dismissed by the circuit court on the ground that it was time-
barred by the one-year limitation period of W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(c). 2
On appeal, the court accepted Stanley's argument that the action should
be considered as one for fraud and deceit which is governed by the two-year
statute of limitations.193 The court defined constructive fraud as a "breach of a
legal or equitable duty, which, irrespective of moral guilt of the fraud feasor,
the law declares fraudulent, because of its tendency to deceive others, to vio-
late public or private confidence, or to injure public interests."'' Wrongful dis-
charge was found to parallel constructive fraud in that no proof of fraudulent
intent is required.195
The survival statute was liberally construed so that the two-year statute of
limitations applied under W. Va. Code § 55-2-12 and W. Va. Code § 55-7-8a.'90
18s Id.
187 Id.
'" Id. at 706.
188 Id.
190 Id.
191 285 S.E.2d 679 (W. Va. 1982).
192 Id. at 681. W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12(c) (1981) provides in pertinent part as follows:
Every personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought:
... (c) within one year next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be
for any other matter of such nature that, in case a party die, it could not have been
brought at common law by or against his personal representative.
19S 285 S.E.2d at 683.
124 Id.
195 Id.
I"8 Id. W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (1981) (limitation of personal action statute). W. VA. CODE § 55-
7-8a (1981) (survivability statute).
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As a word of caution, the court noted that the standards of Harless-I still gov-
ern a retaliatory discharge action and that it does not follow that an act consti-
tuting fraud and deceit will automatically be retaliatory discharge.197
The court appears to be expanding Harless-I. Indeed, Justice Neely in a
vigorous dissent chastised the court for its willingness not only to permit the
"Harless cause of action to continue its morbid, Grendel-like rampage through
our economic system, the majority has given the monster even greater strength
by extending the time in which the action may be brought."'198 The decision of
the court to extend the period of limitations may be criticized as creating the
potential for nuisance lawsuits.
Deborah McHenry Woodburn
19 285 S.E.2d at 683.
195 Id. at 684.
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